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Abstract 
We document a close link between fluctuations in the propensity to pay dividends and catering 
incentives. First, we use the methodology of Fama and French (2001) to identify a total of four 
distinct trends in the propensity to pay dividends between 1963 and 2000. Second, we show 
that each of these trends lines up with a corresponding fluctuation in catering incentives: The 
propensity to pay increases when a proxy for the stock market dividend premium is positive 
and decreases when it is negative. The lone disconnect is attributable to Nixon-era controls. 
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I. Introduction 
In an important paper, Fama and French (2001) document a major time-series shift in 
dividend policy. Between 1978 and 1999, the fraction of their Compustat sample that pays 
dividends fell from 67% to 21%. They trace part of this decline to a composition effect. In recent 
years, an increasing fraction of firms were unprofitable but had strong growth opportunities, so 
they would not have been expected to pay dividends. However, even after accounting for this 
effect, Fama and French document a large decline in the residual “propensity to pay dividends.” 
In this sense, dividends have been disappearing since 1978.  
 In this paper, we ask whether the catering view of dividends in Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
sheds light on the propensity to pay dividends. That view argues that when investor demand for 
payers is high (low) and Modigliani-Miller style arbitrage is limited, a stock price premium 
(discount) may appear on payers (nonpayers), and firms on the margin may cater to the implied 
investor demand in an attempt to capture this “dividend premium.” Thus, leaving aside its 
allowance of a role for sentiment, the catering view can be viewed as a disequilibrium version of 
the clientele equilibrium view in Black and Scholes (1974). Baker and Wurgler construct proxies 
for the time-varying dividend premium, or catering incentive, and find that they help to explain 
the aggregate rate of dividend initiation and omission.  
We start the current analysis by applying the methodology of Fama and French to earlier 
data. This leads to our first main finding: There are four distinct trends in the propensity to pay 
dividends between 1963 and 2000. The post-1977 decline is the largest and longest, to be sure, 
but the three earlier fluctuations are clearly evident. While these trends are interesting in their 
own right, more important for us is that they essentially quadruple the degrees of freedom 
available for our analysis. Our second main finding is that each of these trends can be connected 
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to a corresponding fluctuation in a proxy for catering incentives, the stock market dividend 
premium variable from Baker and Wurgler. This variable, measured annually, is defined as the 
log difference in the value-weighted average market-to-book of payers and the value-weighted 
average market-to-book of nonpayers.  
Specifically, the dividend premium is positive in the mid-1960’s, coinciding with the first 
(increasing) trend in the propensity to pay that we document. Then it falls to negative territory 
through 1969, suggesting a premium for nonpayers, and accurately predicts the onset of the 
second (decreasing) trend. The dividend premium goes positive once again in 1970 and remains 
positive through 1977. While the propensity to pay does not begin its third (increasing) trend 
until 1973 or 1975, depending on how this variable is constructed, there is a simple explanation 
for the brief misfit. In the early 1970’s, Nixon’s Committee on Interest and Dividends actively 
discouraged increases in dividends in an effort to fight inflation. Once their artificial controls 
were lifted, however, the propensity to pay immediately resumed alignment with catering 
incentives. Most striking of all, the dividend premium goes back to negative values in 1978 and 
remains negative essentially through 2000. Thus it accurately predicts both the onset and 
continuation of the fourth (decreasing) trend, the post-1977 disappearance.  
 Further analysis firms up the link between catering incentives and the propensity to pay. 
Going beyond a qualitative correspondence, we find that the dividend premium is able to explain 
the actual magnitude of the post-1977 disappearance in an out-of-sample test. We also find that 
the dividend premium and changes in the propensity to pay forecast the relative stock returns of 
payers and nonpayers, which bolsters the argument that these variables were associated with a 
real or perceived mispricing driven by investor demand.  
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Finally, we conduct an exhaustive review of historical New York Times articles pertaining 
to dividends to better understand fluctuations in the investor demand for payers. This review 
suggests an intuitive pattern. The dividend premium tends to be negative, and the propensity to 
pay to decrease, when sentiment for growth stocks (characteristically nonpayers) is high, such as 
in the late-1960’s and late-1990’s. Following crashes in growth stocks, demand appears to favor 
the “safe” returns on payers, the dividend premium rises, and dividends appear. This appears to 
characterize the mid-1960’s, early- to mid-1970’s, and perhaps the period of this writing. 
In sum, our results profitably marry the work of Fama and French (2001) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). While more research on the demand side is necessary, our results establish that 
the catering view of the supply side offers an empirically successful account of the post-1977 
disappearance of dividends as well as earlier appearances and disappearances. Of course, our 
results do not rule out that other influences affect the propensity to pay – indeed, recent work 
finds some effect of repurchases (Grullon and Michaely (2002)), executive stock options (Fenn 
and Liang (2001)), and asymmetric information (Amihud and Li (2002)) – but they raise the bar 
from explaining one trend to explaining four.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II documents four trends in the propensity to pay 
dividends between 1963 and 2000. Section III matches these to catering incentives and Nixon-
era controls. Section IV explores evidence on investor demand. Section V concludes.  
 
II. Four trends in the propensity to pay dividends, 1963-2000 
Here we use the methodology of Fama and French (2001) to describe the evolution of the 
propensity to pay dividends from 1963 through 2000. Our sample is defined as there (p. 40-41): 
“The Compustat sample for calendar year t … includes those firms with fiscal year-ends in t that 
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have the following data (Compustat annual data items in parentheses): total assets (6), stock 
price (199) and shares outstanding (25) at the end of the fiscal year, income before extraordinary 
items (18), interest expense (15), [cash] dividends per share by ex date (26), preferred dividends 
(19), and (a) preferred stock liquidating value (10), (b) preferred stock redemption value (56), or 
(c) preferred stock carrying value (130). Firms must also have (a) stockholder’s equity (216), (b) 
liabilities (181), or (c) common equity (60) and preferred stock par value (130). Total assets must 
be available in years t and t-1. The other items must be available in t. … We exclude firms with 
book equity below $250,000 or assets below $500,000. To ensure that firms are publicly traded, 
the Compustat sample includes only firms with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11, and we use only 
the fiscal years a firm is in the CRSP database at its fiscal year-end. … We exclude utilities (SIC 
codes 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999).” The average number of firms in 
our sample is 1,776 between 1963 and 1977 and 3,797 between 1978 and 2000. 
Size, investment opportunities, profitability characteristics, and dividend payment are 
also defined as in Fama and French. NYP is the NYSE market capitalization percentile, i.e. the 
fraction of NYSE firms having equal or smaller capitalization than firm i in year t. M/B is the 
market-to-book ratio, defined as book assets minus book equity plus market equity all divided by 
book assets. Market equity is fiscal year closing price times shares outstanding. Book equity is 
stockholders’ equity (or first available of common equity plus preferred stock par value or book 
assets minus liabilities) minus preferred stock liquidating value (or first available of redemption 
value or carrying value) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (35) if 
available and minus post retirement assets (330) if available. Growth in book assets dA/A is self-
explanatory. Profitability E/A is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus 
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income statement deferred taxes (50) divided by book assets. A firm-year observation is a payer 
if it has positive dividends per share by the ex date, else it is a nonpayer. 
 The top panels of Figure 1 show the actual percentage of the sample that pays dividends 
in each year, as well as the percentage of firms that would be expected to be payers given their 
characteristics. The expected percentage is based on firm-level logit models of the probability 
that a firm with given characteristics is a payer. Each year between 1963 and 1977, we estimate 
two models. One includes NYP, M/B, dA/A, and E/A, and the other excludes M/B. (As noted by 
Fama and French, M/B wears several theoretical hats and so it is useful to establish robustness of 
various results to its exclusion.) The average yearly coefficient from these regressions, known as 
Fama-MacBeth estimates, imply the following models: 
( ) 
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dANYPPayer 34.1039.160.363.0logit1Pr . (2) 
The expected percentage of dividend payers in the Compustat sample in year t is then estimated 
by applying Eqs. (1) and (2) to the values of the explanatory variables for each firm, summing 
over firms, dividing by the number of firms and multiplying by 100.1 The “propensity to pay 
dividends” is defined as the difference between the actual percentage and the expected and is 
plotted in the middle panels. The change in the propensity to pay is plotted in the bottom panels.  
While the exact timing of the breaks vary depending on how one measures the propensity 
to pay, the figure reveals four clear trends: (i) an increase from 1963 through 1966-68; (ii) a 
                                                
1 The in-sample nature of the 1963-1977 expected payer estimates is not problematic. The year-by-year model 
coefficients are relatively stable, so similar results obtain if the “training period” is instead 1978-2000 or 1963-2000.  
 6 
decrease from 1967-69 through 1972-74; (iii) an increase from 1973-75 through 1977; and (iv) 
the decrease from 1978 onward identified by Fama and French. Each trend involves hundreds if 
not thousands of firms. Thus, while the latest decline has understandably received the most 
attention, dividends have to some extent “appeared” and “disappeared” before. 
 
III.  Catering incentives and the propensity to pay dividends  
 Here we document that the four historical trends in the propensity to pay dividends 
roughly coincide with four broad fluctuations in catering incentives. Once account is taken of the 
intervention by the Nixon administration in the early 1970’s, the correspondence is all but 
perfect. We then show that these forces can statistically “explain” the post-1977 disappearance of 
dividends in an out-of-sample test. We close with a complementary analysis of stock returns.  
A. Catering incentives 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that managers may try to “cater” to prevailing investor 
demand for dividends by paying dividends when investors are putting a premium on dividend 
payers, and not paying when the dividend premium is negative. While surely not the only 
omitted influence on dividend payment in Eqs. (1) and (2), catering incentives vary over time 
and to a large extent may be separate from firm characteristics. It is natural to examine whether 
they influence the propensity to pay.  
We measure catering incentives between 1962 and 1999 using the “dividend premium” 
variable in Baker and Wurgler. It is defined as follows. Each year, we compute the book-value-
weighted average market-to-book ratio for dividend payers and the average for non-payers. The 
dividend premium is the difference between the logs of these averages. The market-to-book ratio 
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used here is defined using the calendar-year end stock price, rather than the fiscal-year end price, 
but otherwise follows the definition given above.  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that this variable is significantly correlated with other 
plausible measures of investor demand for dividends, including a high correlation with a 
dividend premium variable based on the dual-class structure of the Citizens Utilities company, 
and a significant positive correlation with the average announcement effect of dividend initiators. 
It is also significantly negatively correlated with the future returns of a portfolio that is long 
payers and short nonpayers (although a formal predictive relationship is not established there). 
These correlations suggest that the dividend premium variable, while quite crude, is a reasonable 
candidate for measuring the relative investor demand for payers.  
The catering theory involves dynamics in disequilibrium, and thus essentially maintains 
that uninformed investor demand for dividend payers fluctuates faster than firms can or do 
adjust. A nontrivial dividend premium (or discount) appears, and firms are presumed to cater to 
the implied excess demand. The appropriate comparison is thus between changes in the 
propensity to pay and the beginning-of-period level of the dividend premium. Figure 2 plots the 
(lagged) dividend premium against the annual changes in the propensity to pay. For convenience, 
however, we also show plots against the level of the propensity to pay.  
Figure 2 illustrates an impressive degree of agreement between the two series. In terms of 
the four trends: (i) The dividend premium predicts an increasing propensity to pay between 1963 
and 1967 (that is, it takes positive values between 1962 and 1966), and the propensity to pay is 
indeed rising between 1963 and 1966 (no M/B) or 1968 (M/B), an essentially perfect fit. (ii) The 
dividend premium then goes negative to predict a declining propensity to pay from 1968 through 
1970. This predicted turning point is also borne out in the data.  
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 Regarding trend (iii), the dividend premium flips sign again in the early 1970’s, its lag 
predicting a rising propensity to pay from 1971 through 1978. However, there are a few years of 
misfit here: The propensity to pay doesn’t actually start rising until 1973 (no M/B) or 1975 
(M/B). After that, however, it does rise through 1977 by both measures. Thus, although the 
second “appearance” of dividends did ultimately occur, it was predicted a few years too early. 
(More on this period below.) Finally, the dividend premium’s most striking success is in 
predicting the (iv) post-1977 disappearance. The dividend premium falls sharply around this 
period, and goes from positive to negative precisely in 1978. Moreover, it remains negative 
through the end of the data, except for a brief flirtation in 1998. Thus it predicts not only the 
onset but the continued fall in the propensity to pay over this long period.  
In sum, the dividend premium has run through four positive/negative cycles in this 
sample period, and these correspond closely with the four observed trends in the propensity to 
pay. Note that there is no case in which changes in the propensity to pay predate changes in the 
dividend premium, and only one period in which the lag was substantial. The results suggest that 
catering incentives may have a central effect on the propensity to pay.  
B. Nixon-era dividend controls 
 From August 15 through December 31, 1971, the Nixon Administration declared a 
dividend freeze as part of its efforts to curb inflation. In November of 1971, the Committee on 
Interest and Dividends announced that corporations should observe a 4 percent dividend growth 
guideline in declaring dividends effective January 1, 1972. The base for this calculation was the 
maximum of total dividends per share paid in any of the three prior fiscal years – and so a 
corporation that paid zero dividends per share in these years would, under the text of the 
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guideline, also be limited to zero dividends in 1972. Essentially similar guidelines remained in 
place until the Committee was dissolved on April 30, 1974.  
While compliance with these guidelines was ostensibly voluntary, “the Administration 
put heavy pressure on corporations to comply with the President’s request” (New York Times 
11/3/1971), and the available evidence indicates that the policy had bite. In the first several 
months of the program, the Committee monitored 7,000 firms and requested that a dividend 
increase be rolled back by only 29, most of which met the request (New York Times 5/7/1972). 
Related evidence appears in Dann (1981), who finds that repurchases, which did not violate the 
controls, spiked in 1973 and 1974.2 
The Nixon controls likely explain the dividend premium’s misfit in the early 1970’s. The 
years 1972, 1973, and 1974 are shaded in Figure 2. The controls appear to have kept the 
propensity to pay in decline even though catering incentives pointed the other way. Once the 
controls were lifted, the propensity to pay realigned with catering incentives.  
C. Regressions and an out-of-sample test 
It is clear from the plots that the dividend premium will predict changes in the propensity 
to pay. Table 1 confirms this formally. We report univariate regressions that include only the 
dividend premium and bivariate specifications that include a dummy for the Nixon controls.  
tt
NDD
tt vcNixonbPaPTP +++=∆
−
−1  (3) 
As discussed above, this specification is appropriate for a disequilibrium theory like catering. We 
run (3) for both versions of the PTP series, and for the full sample and the 1963-1977 subperiod. 
 The dividend premium PD-ND is standardized in this regression, so the results indicate that 
a one-SD higher level of catering incentives (about an 18 percentage point higher value of the 
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dividend premium) is associated with a one- to one-and-a-half percentage point increase in the 
propensity to pay dividends, while the Nixon controls appear to have reduced the propensity to 
pay by a few percentage points per year.  
Given the prominence of the post-1977 decline in the propensity to pay, an important 
question is whether catering incentives can empirically “explain” it. To give a precise answer to 
this question one must stay faithful to Fama and French’s empirical framework. To review, they 
use the 1963-1977 Compustat data to fit a model of the expected percentage of payers, and then 
they evaluate this model at the sample characteristics that prevail from 1978 and forward to 
make a true out-of-sample forecast of the expected percentage in each year. The difference 
between the actual and the expected percentage is the propensity to pay.  
By analogy, the way to determine whether catering incentives could account for the 
decline within this framework is to first take the propensity to pay variable as data. Then fit a 
regression model between the propensity to pay and the (lagged) dividend premium over the 
1963-1977 series, and use the fitted model to forecast the expected propensity to pay from 1978 
forward. To the extent that the actual decline in the propensity to pay lines up with this forecast, 
the disappearance is explained, as an empirical matter. 
Table 2 shows that the dividend premium is able to account for the magnitude of the post-
1977 disappearance.3 One can calculate that the average absolute forecast error when market-to-
book is included is only 3.4 percentage points (usually positive), and 4.0 percentage points 
(usually negative) when it is excluded. The table also reports out-of-sample forecasts made by 
the bivariate model that includes the Nixon dummy. This brings the average absolute forecast 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Perhaps unaware of the controls, Dann expresses some puzzlement at the data (p. 121), but Bagwell and Shoven 
(1989) make the connection. 
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error down to only 2.2 percentage points in the case where market-to-book is included. Given 
that PTP is itself surely measured with at least a few percentage points of error, these forecasts 
seem about as accurate as one could reasonably expect.  
D. Evidence from returns 
 Some additional evidence consistent with catering comes from stock return predictability 
regressions. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that the aggregate rate of dividend initiation and 
omission predict the relative stock returns of payers and nonpayers. When initiations (omissions) 
are common, returns on payers are relatively low (high) over the next one to three years. The 
results are consistent with the joint hypothesis of catering-motivated decisions and medium-
horizon reversal of relative mispricing.4 We briefly extend this analysis by testing the predictive 
power of the two variables focused on here – the dividend premium variable itself and changes in 
PTP. We view predictive power for the dividend premium as more of an assumption of the 
catering view, and predictive power for changes in PTP as more of a novel implication.  
As the difference between two scaled-price variables, the dividend premium might be 
expected to have some power to predict the difference in returns of payers and nonpayers. Panel 
A of Table 3 generally confirms this. The table reports both OLS coefficients and coefficients 
adjusted for the Stambaugh (1999) small-sample bias. We use the (standardized) dividend 
premium to forecast the difference between the annual returns on value-weighted indexes of 
payers and nonpayers. We find that a one-SD increase in the dividend premium is associated 
with a relative return on payers over nonpayers that is 3.6 percentage points lower in the first 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Since the dividend premium-based forecasts are generated from regressions of changes on levels in Table 1, we 
forecast changes in the propensity to pay, starting in 1978, and then cumulate them to estimate the expected 
propensity to pay from year to year. 
4 One can also imagine a somewhat less stark model in which managers are not explicitly motivated by perceived 
stock market mispricing, but simply cater to extreme investor demands. 
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year ahead, 8.9 percentage points lower in the second year ahead, and 10.9 percentage points 
lower in the third year ahead. The results for the one and two-year ahead returns are significant 
using the bootstrap described in Baker and Wurgler (2002).  
 Changes in the propensity to pay might also be expected to have some predictive power, 
given the aforementioned results for the raw rate of initiations and omissions. The mechanical 
connection between those raw rates and the perhaps more interesting changes in PTP variable is 
hardly exact, however, because of new lists, delists, and the netting out of firm characteristics in 
PTP. The effect of all these adjustments is a priori unclear, but the lower panels of Table 3 
generally support the hypothesized pattern. The independent variable in each of these panels is a 
version of the (standardized) change in PTP.  
The results suggest that a one-SD increase in the propensity to pay is associated with 
future relative returns on payers which are lower by roughly several percent per year. However, 
statistical significance is sensitive to horizon, which the theory does not specify. One notable 
pattern is the effect of including market-to-book in the PTP definition: Results that include it are 
marginal at best, while those that exclude it are strong. Figure 1 provides an account for this 
difference. Panels C and D there show that the inclusion of market-to-book appears to add high-
frequency “noise” to the four low-frequency trends. The fact that the predictability evidence gets 
stronger when this variation is cut out tends to increase our confidence that it is genuine. Overall, 
the results provide some additional evidence that appears consistent with the catering story. 
 
IV. Investor demand for payers and nonpayers 
The results above establish a tight link between a proxy for catering incentives and the 
propensity to pay dividends. This is the main message of the paper. Taking this as evidence that 
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catering motives are important to the supply of paying firms, the rest of the story pertains to the 
demand side. To what investor demand are firms catering? There are two broad possibilities: 
traditional dividend clienteles, such as those outlined by Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Black 
and Scholes (1974), and some notion of investor sentiment.  
Our first approach to understanding the demand side is to extend the Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) analysis of the raw rate of initiations and omissions and regress changes in PTP directly 
on three proxies for dividend clienteles. Because the approach is similar, we summarize the 
exercise only briefly. We form three clientele proxies. The personal tax advantage for dividends 
(in practice, a net disadvantage) is the relative after-tax income from dividends versus long-term 
capital gains for individual investors as calculated by the NBER TAXSIM model (Feenberg and 
Coutts (1993)). The corporate tax advantage of dividend income as the relative after-tax income 
from dividends versus long-term capital gains for C corporations. 1970-2000 corporate rates are 
from Graham (2003), earlier are from various issues of the IRS Statistics of Income. Finally, to 
proxy for transaction cost-driven clienteles, total one-way trading costs are defined as one-half 
the average bid-ask spread on DJIA stocks plus the average commission on round-lot NYSE 
transactions. The transaction cost data are from Jones (2002). 
 We then regress these clientele proxies on changes in PTP as in Equation (3). We exclude 
the dividend premium from these regressions, since in the logic of the theory it represents a 
summary statistic for excess clientele demand. We find that none of these three proxies has a 
robust effect on the change in PTP.5 Indeed, the tax clientele proxies are consistently the wrong 
sign. While these proxies surely mis-measure clientele demands to some extent, they appear to 
be straightforward measures and have been used in prior work. 
                                                
5 A table is available upon request. 
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 Our second approach to understanding demand is an exhaustive analysis of New York 
Times articles pertaining to dividends. We use the search engine Factiva to identify all Times 
articles published between January 1, 1969 (when Factiva coverage begins) and December 31, 
2001 that contain “dividend” or “dividends” at least twice in the abstract.6 This leads to an initial 
sample of 1,567 unique articles to inspect more closely. We read the abstract of each of these 
articles to determine whether the article may contain some discussion of dividends that goes 
beyond firm characteristics, and hence may be relevant to understanding the propensity to pay. 
Most articles do not satisfy this screen. Ultimately, 103 of the initial set of abstracts suggest that 
the article contains some useful commentary, and we read the full text of each of the 103 articles 
from the New York Times archives. 
Reassuringly, we find that a large number of these stories are suggestive of time-varying 
catering incentives. In particular, while references to clienteles based on transaction costs or 
institutional investment constraints are almost nonexistent, there are many mentions of dividends 
in the context of taxes and investor sentiment. However, many of the tax references involve tax 
policy proposals that were ultimately not implemented. For instance, those that appear around 
the crucial 1977-78 turning point in PTP include a proposal to eliminate double taxation of 
dividends and a proposal to withhold taxes on dividend income. Both proposals were defeated 
and thus could have no persistent effect on PTP. More generally, there is little agreement 
between the timing and content of the tax-related articles and actual fluctuations in the dividend 
premium or PTP. This seems consistent with our own “non-results” described above. 
The sentiment references provide more affirmative evidence. While Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) report a correlation between the dividend premium and the closed-end fund discount, 
                                                
6 The search engine for historical Wall Street Journal articles is not sufficiently precise. For example, one cannot 
exclude advertisements. This causes thousands of false “hits” and makes the analysis unmanageable.  
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suggestive of some role for sentiment, the news reports give more descriptive color. Table 4 
summarizes the basic pattern through a small sample of Times quotations. Which ones to present 
is somewhat arbitrary; these are chosen because they span a wide period and capture themes that 
appear repeatedly. 7  
The interesting thing to note here is that the clusters of sentiment-related references 
coincide with observed patterns in the dividend premium and the propensity to pay. For instance, 
almost all of the references to sentiment for dividends appear in the years just before 1977, as the 
dividend premium was high and the propensity to pay was rising to a local maximum. The 
references that suggest sentiment was against payers occur after that, when the propensity to pay 
was low and falling. Some of these quotations also make reference to the late-1960’s market 
environment (which predates Factiva coverage). They describe a boom in sentiment for new 
issues and extreme-growth stocks that is similar to the late-1990’s boom. This parallel is also 
noted by Malkiel (1999). In both of these eras, of course, the data suggest a discount on payers 
and a declining propensity to pay.  
While there are clear limits to this sort of analysis, it sheds some useful, if preliminary, 
light on the nature of the demand for payers. In particular, Table 4 (and the articles that could not 
be included there) suggests that the patterns we observe are affected by booms and busts in 
extreme-growth stocks, characteristically nonpayers. When sentiment for growth is high, as in 
the late 1960’s and the late 1990’s, the marginal investor appears to demand opportunities for 
capital gains, not staid firms that pay dividends. The dividend premium is negative and dividends 
tend to disappear. When this sentiment reverses, typically following a crash, the marginal 
investor demands stocks with perceived “safe” features including dividends. This seems to 
                                                
7 Complete details of the database search procedure, classification, and results are available upon request.  
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characterize the mid-1960’s (which followed an early-1960’s crash in growth stocks) and the 
mid-1970’s, where the dividend premium rises and the propensity to pay increases.8  
 
V. Conclusion 
We establish a close empirical link between the propensity to pay dividends and catering 
incentives. First, we apply the methodology of Fama and French (2001) to earlier data to identify 
four distinct trends in the propensity to pay between 1963 and 2000 – two “appearances” and two 
“disappearances.” Second, we show that each of these trends is associated with a corresponding 
fluctuation in catering incentives, where the latter is measured by the dividend premium variable 
from Baker and Wurgler (2002). Once the impact of the early 1970’s intervention by Nixon’s 
Committee on Interest and Dividends is noted, our analysis addresses essentially all significant 
fluctuations in the post-1963 propensity to pay time series. Moreover, we show that catering 
incentives are able to explain, in the appropriate out-of-sample test, the actual magnitude of the 
post-1977 disappearance documented by Fama and French.  
A review of historical articles from the financial press suggests that firms may be catering 
to sentiment-driven demand. Dividends tend to disappear during pronounced booms in growth 
stocks, and reappear after crashes in such stocks. The next few years will offer an out-of-sample 
test of this dynamic: Internet stocks have recently crashed and market observers characterize the 
current period as a bear market. If these market conditions continue, history suggests that the 
dividend premium will rise and dividends will reappear. 
                                                
8 Consistent with this dynamic, Fuller and Goldstein (2002) find that payers have higher (less negative) returns than 
nonpayers in months in which the S&P Index return is negative. This holds after controlling for factor loadings.  
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 Figure 1. The propensity to pay dividends, 1963-2000. Panels A and B show the actual percent (solid) and 
expected percent (dashed) of dividend payers in Compustat. Panels C and D show the propensity to pay dividends, 
i.e. the difference between the actual and expected percent. Panels E and F show changes in the propensity to pay 
dividends. Actual percent is the number of dividend payers divided by the number of firms in the sample that year. 
Expected percent is the expected percent of dividend payers based on prevailing sample characteristics. Following 
Fama and French (2001), one set of results (Panels A, C, and E) estimates the expected percent of payers with a logit 
model that includes the NYSE market capitalization percentile, the market-to-book ratio, asset growth, and 
profitability. The other set (Panels B, D, and F) excludes market-to-book. The propensity to pay dividends PTP is 
the difference between the actual and expected percent.  
Panel A. Actual and expected percent payers Panel B. Actual and expected percent payers (no M/B) 
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Panel C. The propensity to pay dividends Panel D. The propensity to pay dividends (no M/B) 
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Panel E. Changes in the propensity to pay Panel F. Changes in the propensity to pay (no M/B) 
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 Figure 2. The dividend premium and changes in the propensity to pay. Panel A shows the value-weighted 
dividend premium from Baker and Wurgler (2002) in percentage terms (lagged once; dashed line; right axis), 
changes in the propensity to pay dividends (solid line; left axis), and shading to denote the 1972 through 1974 Nixon 
dividend controls era. Panel B shows changes in the propensity to pay estimated from a measure that excludes 
market-to-book as a firm characteristic.  
Panel A. The dividend premium, Nixon controls, and changes in the propensity to pay   
 
Panel B. The dividend premium, Nixon controls, and changes in the propensity to pay (no M/B) 
 
 Table 1. Regressions to explain changes in the propensity to pay. Changes in the propensity to pay dividends 
regressed on the lagged value-weighted dividend premium and a dummy for the 1972 through 1974 Nixon dividend 
controls period: 
tt
NDD
tt vcNixonbPaPTP +++=∆
−
−1 . 
The dividend premium PD-ND is standardized to have unit variance. The left panels report regressions where PTP is 
estimated using a firm-level model of dividend payment that includes market-to-book as a relevant firm 
characteristic. The right panels report regressions where market-to-book is not included. T-statistics use standard 
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags.  
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 b [t] c [t] b [t] c [t] 
 Panel A. 1963-2000 
Univariate 1.04 [2.4] . . 1.15 [3.2] . . 
Bivariate 1.53 [4.8] -4.45 [-4.7] 1.22 [3.1] -0.70 [-1.3] 
 Panel B. 1963-1977 
Univariate 1.19 [1.7] . . 1.23 [5.7] . . 
Bivariate 1.70 [2.2] -4.53 [-3.9] 1.34 [5.0] -1.01 [-1.4] 
 Ta
bl
e 
2.
 O
ut
 o
f 
sa
m
pl
e 
fo
re
ca
st
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
op
en
si
ty
 t
o 
pa
y 
di
vi
de
nd
s. 
A
ct
ua
l p
er
ce
nt
 is
 p
ay
er
s 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 f
irm
s. 
To
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 p
re
se
nt
, w
e 
ru
n 
Fa
m
a-
M
ac
Be
th
 lo
gi
t r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 o
f 
di
vi
de
nd
 p
ol
ic
y 
on
 f
irm
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s, 
us
in
g 
fir
m
-y
ea
r 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 1
96
3 
to
 1
97
7.
 T
he
 f
irm
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
N
Y
SE
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 N
YP
, a
ss
et
 g
ro
w
th
 d
A/
A,
 a
nd
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 E
/A
. T
he
 s
ix
 fo
ur
 c
ol
um
ns
 a
ls
o 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t-t
o-
bo
ok
 ra
tio
 M
/B
, w
hi
le
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 s
ix
 c
ol
um
ns
 
do
 n
ot
. E
xp
ec
te
d 
pe
rc
en
t o
f p
ay
er
s f
or
 a
 y
ea
r t
 is
 e
st
im
at
ed
 b
y 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
lo
gi
t r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s f
or
 1
96
3-
19
77
 to
 th
e 
va
lu
es
 o
f t
he
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 fi
rm
 fo
r 
ye
ar
 t,
 s
um
m
in
g 
ov
er
 fi
rm
s, 
di
vi
di
ng
 b
y 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 f
irm
s 
an
d 
th
en
 m
ul
tip
ly
in
g 
by
 1
00
. T
he
 p
ro
pe
ns
ity
 to
 p
ay
 P
TP
 is
 th
e 
ac
tu
al
 p
er
ce
nt
 
m
in
us
 th
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 p
er
ce
nt
. E
xp
ec
te
d 
PT
P 
ar
e 
th
e 
fo
re
ca
st
 v
al
ue
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 st
ag
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 in
 T
ab
le
 1
. 
  
 
M
/B
t i
nc
lu
de
d 
M
/B
t e
xc
lu
de
d 
 
 
Ba
se
 d
at
a 
D
iv
id
en
d 
Pr
em
iu
m
 
D
iv
id
en
d 
Pr
em
iu
m
, 
N
ix
on
 
Ba
se
 d
at
a 
D
iv
id
en
d 
Pr
em
iu
m
 
D
iv
id
en
d 
Pr
em
iu
m
, 
N
ix
on
 
 
A
ct
ua
l 
Pe
rc
en
t 
E
xp
ec
te
d 
PT
P 
E
xp
ec
te
d
PT
P
PT
P 
– 
E
xp
ec
te
d 
PT
P
E
xp
ec
te
d
PT
P
PT
P 
– 
E
xp
ec
te
d 
PT
P
E
xp
ec
te
d 
PT
P
E
xp
ec
te
d
PT
P
PT
P 
– 
E
xp
ec
te
d 
PT
P
E
xp
ec
te
d
PT
P
PT
P 
– 
E
xp
ec
te
d 
PT
P
19
78
 
69
.5
4 
70
.9
7 
-1
.4
3 
-0
.5
7 
-0
.8
6 
0.
04
 
-1
.4
7 
67
.6
2 
1.
92
 
-0
.3
6 
2.
28
 
-0
.2
2 
2.
14
 
19
79
 
64
.7
5 
68
.6
8 
-3
.9
3 
-1
.7
8 
-2
.1
6 
-0
.8
3 
-3
.1
0 
66
.5
9 
-1
.8
5 
-1
.3
7 
-0
.4
7 
-1
.1
6 
-0
.6
9 
19
80
 
61
.9
7 
66
.7
4 
-4
.7
6 
-3
.5
9 
-1
.1
7 
-2
.5
8 
-2
.1
8 
67
.1
0 
-5
.1
3 
-3
.0
2 
-2
.1
0 
-2
.8
0 
-2
.3
3 
19
81
 
55
.0
7 
63
.9
6 
-8
.8
8 
-5
.9
3 
-2
.9
6 
-5
.0
7 
-3
.8
1 
64
.7
2 
-9
.6
4 
-5
.2
1 
-4
.4
4 
-5
.0
2 
-4
.6
2 
19
82
 
50
.1
5 
59
.5
6 
-9
.4
1 
-8
.4
4 
-0
.9
7 
-7
.8
3 
-1
.5
8 
60
.8
5 
-1
0.
69
 
-7
.5
8 
-3
.1
1 
-7
.4
5 
-3
.2
4 
19
83
 
44
.1
1 
52
.4
5 
-8
.3
5 
-1
0.
43
 
2.
09
 
-9
.8
2 
1.
47
 
58
.1
3 
-1
4.
03
 
-9
.4
1 
-4
.6
2 
-9
.2
8 
-4
.7
5 
19
84
 
40
.7
1 
55
.4
5 
-1
4.
74
 
-1
3.
03
 
-1
.7
1 
-1
2.
70
 
-2
.0
4 
57
.4
2 
-1
6.
72
 
-1
1.
87
 
-4
.8
4 
-1
1.
80
 
-4
.9
2 
19
85
 
39
.2
4 
51
.6
6 
-1
2.
42
 
-1
4.
73
 
2.
31
 
-1
4.
28
 
1.
86
 
55
.5
7 
-1
6.
33
 
-1
3.
40
 
-2
.9
3 
-1
3.
30
 
-3
.0
3 
19
86
 
34
.8
5 
47
.7
1 
-1
2.
86
 
-1
6.
34
 
3.
48
 
-1
5.
72
 
2.
86
 
52
.8
8 
-1
8.
03
 
-1
4.
83
 
-3
.2
0 
-1
4.
70
 
-3
.3
3 
19
87
 
31
.3
8 
48
.1
8 
-1
6.
81
 
-1
7.
70
 
0.
89
 
-1
6.
81
 
0.
00
 
52
.7
5 
-2
1.
37
 
-1
6.
00
 
-5
.3
7 
-1
5.
81
 
-5
.5
6 
19
88
 
31
.5
9 
51
.0
8 
-1
9.
49
 
-1
9.
08
 
-0
.4
1 
-1
7.
95
 
-1
.5
4 
54
.3
0 
-2
2.
71
 
-1
7.
21
 
-5
.5
0 
-1
6.
96
 
-5
.7
5 
19
89
 
32
.3
1 
51
.7
8 
-1
9.
46
 
-2
0.
47
 
1.
01
 
-1
9.
08
 
-0
.3
8 
55
.9
5 
-2
3.
64
 
-1
8.
41
 
-5
.2
2 
-1
8.
11
 
-5
.5
3 
19
90
 
32
.3
1 
54
.7
7 
-2
2.
46
 
-2
1.
92
 
-0
.5
4 
-2
0.
30
 
-2
.1
6 
57
.3
3 
-2
5.
02
 
-1
9.
68
 
-5
.3
4 
-1
9.
32
 
-5
.7
0 
19
91
 
31
.1
0 
51
.1
3 
-2
0.
04
 
-2
2.
86
 
2.
83
 
-2
0.
79
 
0.
75
 
57
.1
6 
-2
6.
06
 
-2
0.
42
 
-5
.6
4 
-1
9.
97
 
-6
.0
9 
19
92
 
29
.8
7 
50
.2
2 
-2
0.
35
 
-2
4.
04
 
3.
69
 
-2
1.
63
 
1.
28
 
56
.5
8 
-2
6.
71
 
-2
1.
41
 
-5
.3
0 
-2
0.
88
 
-5
.8
3 
19
93
 
27
.3
2 
47
.5
2 
-2
0.
20
 
-2
5.
27
 
5.
07
 
-2
2.
53
 
2.
33
 
54
.8
4 
-2
7.
51
 
-2
2.
45
 
-5
.0
7 
-2
1.
84
 
-5
.6
7 
19
94
 
26
.1
5 
49
.8
0 
-2
3.
65
 
-2
6.
90
 
3.
25
 
-2
4.
01
 
0.
36
 
55
.0
1 
-2
8.
86
 
-2
3.
90
 
-4
.9
6 
-2
3.
27
 
-5
.5
9 
19
95
 
25
.4
1 
49
.1
0 
-2
3.
69
 
-2
8.
27
 
4.
58
 
-2
5.
11
 
1.
42
 
56
.1
2 
-3
0.
71
 
-2
5.
09
 
-5
.6
2 
-2
4.
39
 
-6
.3
2 
19
96
 
23
.3
8 
47
.0
2 
-2
3.
65
 
-3
0.
14
 
6.
49
 
-2
6.
94
 
3.
29
 
54
.6
6 
-3
1.
28
 
-2
6.
79
 
-4
.4
9 
-2
6.
08
 
-5
.2
0 
19
97
 
22
.4
9 
46
.7
5 
-2
4.
26
 
-3
1.
63
 
7.
37
 
-2
8.
23
 
3.
97
 
54
.1
6 
-3
1.
67
 
-2
8.
11
 
-3
.5
7 
-2
7.
36
 
-4
.3
1 
19
98
 
22
.8
8 
48
.9
0 
-2
6.
01
 
-3
2.
83
 
6.
81
 
-2
9.
08
 
3.
07
 
55
.3
3 
-3
2.
44
 
-2
9.
11
 
-3
.3
3 
-2
8.
28
 
-4
.1
6 
19
99
 
22
.6
4 
48
.6
6 
-2
6.
03
 
-3
3.
61
 
7.
58
 
-2
9.
34
 
3.
31
 
56
.2
7 
-3
3.
63
 
-2
9.
69
 
-3
.9
4 
-2
8.
74
 
-4
.8
9 
20
00
 
22
.1
9 
49
.4
5 
-2
7.
26
 
-3
6.
67
 
9.
41
 
-3
2.
88
 
5.
62
 
55
.6
7 
-3
3.
47
 
-3
2.
62
 
-0
.8
5 
-3
1.
79
 
-1
.6
8 
 Table 3. Changes in the propensity to pay dividends: Predicting returns, 1962-2000. Univariate regressions of 
future excess returns of dividend payers and nonpayers on the changes in the propensity to pay dividends. The 
dependent variable in is the difference in future returns between dividend payers and nonpayers. rt+k denotes returns 
in year t+k, and Rt+k denotes cumulative returns from t+1 through t+k. In panel A, the independent variable in panel 
is the value-weighted dividend premium from Baker and Wurgler (2002) in percentage terms. In Panels B through 
E, the independent variable is the change in the propensity to pay dividends. In Panels B and D, the propensity to 
pay is estimated including the market-to-book ratio as a firm characteristic. In Panels C and E, the propensity to pay 
is estimated without the market-to-book ratio. Panels D and E make an adjustment for the influence of the Nixon 
controls, using the 1963-1977 Nixon coefficients from Table 1. All independent variables are standardized to have 
zero mean and unit variance. We report OLS coefficients and bias-adjusted (BA) coefficients. Bootstrap p-values 
represent a two-tailed test of the null of no predictability. 
 
 N OLS BA  [p-val] R2
 Panel A. Dividend premium 
rDt+1 – rNDt+1 37 -6.24 -3.63 [0.25] 0.07 
rDt+2 – rNDt+2 36 -10.12 -8.94 [0.03] 0.17 
rDt+3 – rNDt+3 35 -11.26 -10.87 [0.02] 0.22 
RDt+3 – RNDt+3 35 -26.21 -21.50 [0.07] 0.33 
 Panel B. Changes in PTP (M/B included) 
rDt+1 – rNDt+1 37 -0.50 -0.94 [0.90] 0.00 
rDt+2 – rNDt+2 36 -7.11 -7.57 [0.08] 0.08 
rDt+3 – rNDt+3 35 -6.21 -6.48 [0.15] 0.06 
RDt+3 – RNDt+3 35 -14.37 -15.29 [0.32] 0.10 
 Panel C. Changes in PTP (M/B excluded) 
rDt+1 – rNDt+1 37 -6.03 -5.71 [0.19] 0.05 
rDt+2 – rNDt+2 36 -15.05 -15.25 [0.00] 0.34 
rDt+3 – rNDt+3 35 -11.80 -11.65 [0.02] 0.22 
RDt+3 – RNDt+3 35 -32.68 -33.43 [0.02] 0.47 
 Panel D. Changes in PTP (M/B included), Nixon adjustment 
rDt+1 – rNDt+1 37 -0.19 -0.63 [0.96] 0.00 
rDt+2 – rNDt+2 36 -8.02 -8.39 [0.05] 0.10 
rDt+3 – rNDt+3 35 -8.46 -8.83 [0.05] 0.12 
RDt+3 – RNDt+3 35 -17.24 -16.90 [0.23] 0.14 
 Panel E. Changes in PTP (M/B excluded) , Nixon adjustment 
rDt+1 – rNDt+1 37 -5.72 -5.45 [0.22] 0.05 
rDt+2 – rNDt+2 36 -14.83 -14.91 [0.00] 0.33 
rDt+3 – rNDt+3 35 -12.14 -12.33 [0.01] 0.23 
RDt+3 – RNDt+3 35 -32.50 -32.00 [0.04] 0.47 
 Table 4. New York Times articles. Selected articles from a Factiva search of New York Times articles over the 
period from 1969 through 2001. 
 
Article date 
Sentiment for 
dividends Quotation 
11/7/1976 Yes “Thanks to … [characteristics and] the rising yield-consciousness of 
stockholders, corporations are fattening their dividend payouts. … As 
investors became chary of the stock market, they were less apt to count on 
future earnings growth … and more likely to return to the bird-in-the-hand 
rationale of cash dividends.” 
5/18/1977 Yes  “After years of disappointment – particularly with low-yielding glamour 
stocks – investors are emphasizing dividends in their stock selections.” 
2/15/1981 No “… nondividend payers have become the Big Board’s star performers in 
recent years … ‘My sophisticated investors never ask me if a stock pays a 
cash dividend,’ says Mr. Schaeffer of Bache. ‘They’d much rather have 
stock dividends than cash dividends.’” 
5/7/1995 No “These days, dividends are rising rapidly, but not as fast as stock prices … 
perhaps we are witnessing a sea change in investor attitudes. … Most 
investors don’t seem to be very interested in dividends just now. … Maybe 
dividends simply don’t matter anymore.” 
1/3/1997 No “In this buoyant stock market, companies have seen relatively little demand 
for higher payouts from shareholders who, after all, have been seeking and 
getting capital gains.” 
10/7/1999 No 
No (late 1960’s) 
Yes (after 1968) 
“What is unusual is that the economy is doing so well even while 
companies are growing more reluctant to raise their dividends … the [last] 
time companies cut back on dividend increases even as the economy 
continued to grow is … the late-1960’s market … bears more than a 
passing resemblance to this one. The stock market had been going up 
steadily for the better part of two decades … Dividends can go so low 
because investors do not care much about them. It is capital gains that have 
made them rich, and it is the pursuit of capital gains that drives stock 
investments now.  … After 1968, as it became clear that capital losses were 
possible, investors came to value dividends, and the pressure grew on 
companies to pay them.” 
1/4/2000 No 
No (late 1960’s) 
“A growing portion of corporate America appears to be concluding that 
dividends are no longer needed to attract investors … decline [in percent of 
payers in S&P] also reflects an investor attitude that puts little pressure on 
companies to make payouts. … The only similar trend occurred in the late 
1960’s, another time that small technology companies were all the rage and 
the market for new issues was red hot. A variety of reasons are given for 
the trend away from dividends, including the tax disadvantages … but that 
has always been true, and the effect presumably should have been greater 
two decades ago, when tax rates were much higher … The most likely 
explanation … would seem to be the most obvious. Investors, after seeing 
year after year of huge capital gains, no longer see much of a need for 
dividends as an assured return if the market declines … ” 
 
